The Council Presidency: power broker or burden? An emperical analysis

The potential impact of the EU Council Presidency on legislative decision-making has been frequently identified. This article provides an empirical analysis of the Presidency's influence on decision outcomes based on a large-n data set. Two counterfactuals are used to represent consensual decision-making and hard bargaining in the Council. The role of supranational actors is controlled for directly. The findings show that a member state benefits from holding the Presidency during the final stages of the legislative proceedings. Besides the support of supranational actors, the regression analysis controls for the voting threshold, the type of proposal and salience

Veto players

Veto players are political actors whose consent is necessary to adopt a new policy. Put otherwise, they\ud have veto power which allows them to prevent a change to the status quo. The concept is crucial to the\ud influential veto player theory developed by George Tsebelis. Building on earlier work in formal\ud modeling and social choice, Tsebelis developed veto player theory to compare political systems in\ud terms of their ability for policy change. A political system with a high number of veto players or with\ud large ideological differences among veto players has high policy stability. High policy stability in turn\ud can lead to government or regime instability as it becomes harder to adapt policy to changing\ud circumstances. Furthermore, high policy stability increases bureaucratic and judicial independence as\ud acts by these branches cannot be easily overruled by new or more specific legislation. Finally, high\ud policy stability limits the effect of agenda-setting power. The following summarizes the main points of\ud veto player theory, discusses some criticisms of it, and briefly compares veto player theory to\ud Immergut’s concept of veto points

Through the needle's eye: the Council presidency and legislative decision-making in the European Union

The thesis scrutinizes the effects of the Council Presidency on legislative decision making in the European Union Council of Ministers. The rotating Council Presidency has been one of most prominent topics of discussion in the debate on institutional reform. So far, however, a comprehensive evaluation of the effects of the Presidency is missing. The thesis addresses two questions: 1. Does the Council presidency have an impact on legislative activity in the Council? 2. Does the Council presidency gain disproportional benefits from the policies agreed upon during its term in office? The methodology used in the thesis consists of an exploratory case study, secondary analysis of the Decision-making in the European Union (DEU) data set, and statistical analysis of an original data set covering legislative activity from 1984-2003. It presents evidence for an effect of the Presidency on both legislative activity and decision outcomes

The rotating Council presidency hinders legislative continuity in the Council of the European Union

The Presidency of the Council of the European Union is held on a rotational basis by EU member states for six month terms. Andreas Warntjen writes that the frequent change of the Presidency sometimes causes disruption in EU legislative decision-making. He notes that during the negotiation of the Lisbon Treaty the principle of increasing the term from six months up to a year was rejected in favour of creating a permanent President of the European Council, which is held by an individual for terms of two and a half years. Despite this change, however, the limited role of the European Council in legislative negotiations has ensured that continuity in Council decision-making still presents a challenge

Overcoming Gridlock: The Council Presidency, Legislative Activity and Issue De-Coupling in the Area of Occupational Health and Safety Regulation

A member state of the European Union can use its term as the Council president to make progress on pending but stalled proposals which it would like to see adopted. This case study of the directive on the risk arising from physical agents shows how a Council presidency can use issue subtraction, additional meetings and compromise proposals to overcome gridlock in the Council. There is a notable difference in terms of legislative activity between the presidencies of high regulation and low regulation countries. High regulation countries put forward compromise proposals and scheduled additional meetings to resolve outstanding issues. The case study also demonstrates the importance of issue subtraction. The original proposal was gridlocked in the Council for five years. Only after the original proposal was split up into several dossiers (issue de-coupling) was it possible to reach agreement

Mode(l)s of Decision-Making in the Council of the European Union

The Council of the EU is a crucial actor in EU legislative decision-making. However, how its reaches decisions is subject to considerable debate. Constructivists argue that the dominant mode is normguided behaviour and deliberation, pointing to the informal ‘culture of consensus’. Scholars working in a rational choice tradition assume that member states strive to move outcomes as close as possible to their ideal positions, either by using their power in bargaining or by arranging beneficial exchanges of votes. Several bargaining and exchange models have been advanced by this literature. Finally, studies report that actors in the Council engage in problem-solving. In this paper, I explore the logics underlying these different conceptualizations of legislative negotiations in the Council of the EU. Furthermore, the paper discusses the interpretation of the existing empirical results and tasks for future research

Designing democratic institutions: Accountability, responsiveness and the reform of the Council of the European Union

The widely perceived lack of legitimacy of EU decision-making has prompted a major debate about institutional reform. Improving democratic practice in the Council has been one of the key topics in the debates leading up to the Lisbon treaty. In general, we can distinguish between two models of democracy. The majoritarian model of democracy builds on the open competition of political camps who enjoy wide-ranging powers to implement their policy agenda once in office. In contrast, the consociational model of democracy relies on inclusiveness, compromises and power-sharing. I discuss the most prominent topics of the recent debate on institutional reform in the Council (voting threshold, Council Presidency, transparency) in light of these two models of democracy. The current practice of decision-making in the Council resembles the consensual model. The changes in the Lisbon Treaty are unlikely to make any significant difference in this regard

Steering the Union. The Impact of the EU Presidency on Legislative Activity in the Council

Their term in office as the Council Presidency offers Member States a unique opportunity to steer the Union's legislative activity according to their national priorities. This article offers evidence in the field of environmental policy for the period 1984 to 2001. Copyright (c) 2007 The Author(s); Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.